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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis uses a new dataset of labor union appearances in congressional hearings 
and archival data on union organizational resources to analyze the factors that determine 
whether a union will participate in congressional hearings in a given year.  Organizational 
resources, including the size of a union’s membership base and the number of lobbyists 
employed in a union’s national office, and environmental factors, such as economic 
conditions and the salience of particular policy topics in a given year, influence whether a 
union will give testimony.  However, some of the benefits of having a large membership 
base for representation may be diminishing over time.  Additionally, as unions face an 
increasingly hostile political environment, there is substantial evidence of a shift away from 
advocacy for broad social causes in favor of testimony on topics directly related to labor 
relations.  Implications for the study of interest group politics and labor union political 
strategies are discussed. 
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Introduction 
 
Most observers agree that there are significant signs of decay in the American labor 
movement today.  Unions have lost much of their ability to achieve gains for workers 
through collective bargaining over the last half-century, as evidenced by the declining role 
of strikes in American industrial relations (Rosenfeld 2006, Rhomberg 2010), effectively 
blocking one of the primary channels for class conflict in the United States (Rubin 1986).  
Indeed, when strikes do occur the results are often disastrous for workers, resulting in 
layoffs, reduced wages, and diminished public opinion of labor (Rosenfeld 2006, Schmidt 
1993).  Whereas some view the decline in strike activity as a positive development for the 
smooth functioning of the American economy (Wachter 2007), it is generally considered to 
be a telling sign of weakness in unions’ collective bargaining function.  However, collective 
bargaining is only one of labor’s roles in society: unions are also political interest groups, 
acting on local, state, national, and international levels to advocate for a wide range of 
public policy objectives.  The extent to which the decline of unions’ economic strength has 
affected their ability to influence the process of writing and implementing new legislation 
is a topic largely neglected by social scientists.  This thesis adds a fresh contribution to a 
rapidly aging body of literature the political strength of American labor unions in the face 
of membership decline. 
 Unions have several avenues at their disposal to attempt to influence public policy.  
Like corporate interest groups, unions have political departments that make direct 
financial contributions to favored candidates.  Additionally, union political departments 
have traditionally been able to contribute “ground troops” in political campaigns, staffing 
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phone banks and ringing doorbells in support of their political allies.  After Election Day, 
most unions’ efforts to shape policy are handed off to another unit: the legislative 
department.  Legislative directors and their staffers are responsible for persuading 
members of Congress to support labor’s legislative goals, whether these are broad efforts 
to strengthen occupational safety regulations or specialized niche issues like six-day mail 
delivery.  But the most visible product of legislative departments’ activities is testimony at 
congressional hearings. By providing testimony at congressional hearings, labor unions 
attempt to advance their interests by informing and educating lawmakers about issues of 
importance to their members, among other functions.   
 Although data on congressional hearings have been used by scholars of other 
substantive policy topics (e.g., Sheingate 2006) and social movements (Brustein and Hirsh 
2007), hearing participation has not yet been used to study American labor unions’ 
political activities.  Indeed, most scholars studying interest groups tend to gravitate 
towards campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures as their primary units of 
analysis (Smith 1995).  While these studies effectively measure the effect of money on 
legislative outcomes, there is no guarantee that a dollar spent on campaign contributions 
will yield access to legislators.  No other published public sources chronicle interest groups’ 
access to legislative institutions as well as congressional hearing abstracts and testimony.  
Participation in congressional hearings thus represents an important tool for shaping 
national policy in unions’ toolkit.  Curiously, though, hearing participation has not been 
systematically studied to date as an indicator of unions’ political strength or agendas, in 
contrast to less direct measures of policy-setting influence such as campaign contributions 
(e.g., Gely and Chandler 1995, Francia 2006).  I argue that congressional hearings are an 
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ideal indicator of the political activities of the labor movement as a whole as well as the 
agendas of individual unions.  While unions often distribute campaign contributions along 
party lines, congressional hearing testimony is presented in response to specific policy 
goals.   Additionally, the process of researching and writing testimony requires a tangible 
infrastructure for legislative advocacy beyond just a checkbook.  Invitations to 
congressional hearings require both networking by full-time lobbyists and legitimacy as a 
political constituency and as an authoritative source of information in the eyes of 
congressional committee staffers.  These characteristics contribute to the richness of 
congressional hearings as an archival data source for understanding the quantity, quality, 
and content of legislative advocacy efforts. 
This study examines union participation in congressional hearings, with the goal of 
identifying the sources of cross-union differences in legislative strategies.  Given the 
unprecedented growth in lobbying activities in recent years, this is a topic of significant 
interest to social scientists and practitioners (Brinbaum 2005).  It also offers insight into 
how legislative advocacy strategies and their corresponding predictors have changed over 
time.  Do organizational resources, such as membership and lobbying staffs, matter more 
than macro-level economic and political factors that unions lack direct influence over in 
determining union participation in congressional hearings?  The result of these analyses is 
a unique portrait of labor unions’ use of one of the primary channels for legislative 
advocacy as well as a clearer understanding of the determinants of interest group 
representation.  In order to gain further information about the nature of congressional 
hearings and their validity as an indicator of unions’ political power and agendas, I 
conducted a series of interviews with labor union legislative directors and policy officials.  
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These interviews revealed significant changes in the nature of congressional hearings over 
the period covered in my dataset, which I explain in a separate section of this thesis that 
follows the presentation of my quantitative analysis.   
Theoretical Expectations 
 
If participation in congressional hearings is a viable strategy for affecting national 
policy, the key question is, “why don’t all unions participate in hearings?” One possible 
answer is offered by resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), which 
argues that organizations’ ability to influence their environment and compete for resources 
is directly constrained by their structural position.  In this context, visible environmental 
threats to the viability of the organization prompt political activism (see also Katz, Batt, and 
Keefe 2003).  This leads me to analyze flows of resources into labor unions to the extent 
that longitudinal data are available. I am particularly interested in testing the hypothesis 
that visible environmental threats prompt organizational political activism.  However, 
where appropriate, I consider the predictions of other schools of thought in organizational 
theory, including institutional theory and organizational learning.  I also attempt to 
integrate theoretical predictions on organizational activism with the existing literature on 
labor union political advocacy. 
Despite the challenges inherent in disentangling the sometimes interdependent 
effects of a union’s environmental context and its flows of resources, this thesis presents an 
exceptionally comprehensive array of variables that could impact legislative advocacy.  
Unlike studies that focus on one particular independent variable, this study enables a 
nuanced analysis of the relative effects of different variables.  By identifying those variables 
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that have the most impact on congressional hearing testimony, this thesis may help labor 
unions to identify those factors that are most important to achieving their goals for 
legislative advocacy, which in turn may lead to public policies that benefit workers. 
 
Organizational Resources 
  
 Several predictors of congressional testimony for labor unions are directly related 
to the resources at an organization’s disposal.  Organizational resources provide labor 
unions with the capacity to draft and deliver testimony.  However, resources also represent 
legitimacy and power, which in turn force legislators to pay attention to the demands of 
unions and their members.   While the legitimacy benefit of having a large number of 
members is difficult to disentangle from the effect of additional volunteers and union dues 
on organizational capacity, identifying organizational predictors of testimony is 
nonetheless an important step in identifying the factors that determine who gets 
represented on Capitol Hill.  Though there are certainly environmental factors that affect a 
union’s ability to organize, affiliate, and allocate resources, in this study I will focus on 
membership size, lobbying and political consulting resources, and labor federation 
affiliation to be representative of a union’s organizational resources. 
One key organizational resource is, of course, the size of the membership base.  Size 
directly impacts the number of potential votes that can be mobilized on behalf of (or in 
opposition to) a politician or proposition, giving large unions more political leverage.  
There are also indirect benefits to size, including the financial resources that come with a 
healthy base of dues-paying members.  Moreover, size tends to be related to diversity.  
Several of the nation’s largest unions, such as the United Steelworkers, United Auto 
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Workers, and United Food and Commercial Workers, organize across multiple industries.  
These large, multi-occupation unions tend to be among the unions some sociologists (e.g., 
Voss and Sherman 2000, Milkman 2006) argue have been “revitalized” in recent years. 
(Some large unions, such as the National Education Association, remain more or less 
dedicated to a single or small set of closely related occupations.)  Nonetheless, it seems 
reasonable to assume that - in addition to the influence that comes from size in and of itself 
– larger unions might have broader legislative portfolios, given the range of interests that 
their diverse membership bases hold.   
Unions with a large number of dues-paying members and activists likely achieve 
some economies of scale in their collective bargaining and member service functions, 
leading to “organizational slack” that can be invested in forward-looking activities (Cyert 
and March 1963, Perrow 1986, Greve 2003).  Larger unions should have more staff and 
activists with otherwise idle hands, which can be tapped for activities without immediate 
relevance to the union’s core functions, such as lobbying Congress on broad social issues.   
While studies of organizational slack in the organizational behavior literature suggest that 
slack is most useful for research and development activities in for-profit firms, for labor 
unions political advocacy is a comparable outlet for excess capacity that enhances their 
long-run viability. 
There may, however, be limits to the benefits of size: for example, at some point 
unions may simply run out of hearings relevant to their areas of expertise in which to 
testify.  Consequently, the positive effect of size will attenuate for the largest unions.   
If a large membership base is important, so too is the size of the cadre of 
professionals who represent unions’ interests. Information about the number of lobbyists 
7 
 
and consultants representing each union is particularly valuable in that it provides a direct 
measure of the level of resources invested by unions in legislative advocacy.  While the 
number of lobbyists hired by a union may be related to financial resources, it can also be 
influenced by the size of competing unions’ legislative departments (however a union 
might define its competition), the depth of a union’s legislative agenda, and the union’s 
preferences for legislative advocacy relative to other tools in their policy toolkit, among 
other factors.  A strong relationship between the number of lobbyists and/or consultants 
and congressional representation would confirm that – regardless of the socioeconomic 
and political environment – union investment in legislative advocacy does translate into 
representation.  On the other hand, a weak relationship or no relationship between this 
proxy for effort and representation would imply that unions are victims of their 
environment, unable to exert influence on the congressional agenda without allies on the 
Hill.   
Another important resource for unions is whether they are part of a larger support 
structure to draw upon for support in their legislative battles.  Like business associations 
that benefit from the support that comes from the infrastructure of the US Chamber of 
Commerce and charities that benefit from the fundraising and coordination services of the 
United Way, labor unions should benefit from being part of an overarching structure. For 
many unions, the AFL-CIO provides a wide variety of support services that should increase 
the effectiveness of legislative advocacy, such as weekly coordinating meetings and 
manpower in lobbying drives.  Through its research and coordination functions, the AFL-
CIO should free up its constituent unions to pursue a broader program of legislative 
advocacy.  Consequently, I expect unions that are members of the AFL-CIO federation to be 
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more effective in legislative advocacy.  However, it must also be acknowledged that there 
could be a “substitution effect” in which the AFL-CIO national organization testifies on 
topics that its member unions would otherwise provide testimony on.  This could attenuate 
some of the benefit of AFL-CIO affiliation for participation in hearings, or potentially result 
in AFL-CIO members being less active in congressional hearings.    
Political Environment 
  
 While resources affect whether the labor union is able to send someone to appear 
before Congress and whether the union will be perceived as a powerful interest group, 
someone on Capitol Hill has to be interested in hearing testimony from a union before an 
invitation is sent.  The likelihood that the invitation will be sent is affected both by whether 
topics that lend themselves to union messages are being considered by Congress and by 
how receptive legislators and their committee staffs are to organized labor.   Thus, who is 
in power and what they are talking about form another set of factors that might influence 
rates of union participation in congressional hearings. 
Favorable interorganzational linkages are a key strategy for the survival and success 
of organizations in achieving their goals (see, for example, Perrow 1986, Mizruchi 1996, 
Uzzi 1996).  Organizations should benefit when entities that they are linked to accrue 
power (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, Perrow 1986, Powell 1990, Stuart 1998).  For labor 
unions’ legislative departments, perhaps the most important linkages are those with the 
executive and legislative branches of government.  In particular, American labor unions 
have traditionally been allied with the political left (Dark 1999, Francia 2006).  While there 
is a risk that labor unions may be so attached to liberal politicians that their support is 
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taken for granted, Dark and Francia agree that the alliance with Democrats has paid 
substantial political dividends to unions.   It is also notable that some of my interview 
subjects (see below) mentioned that they were more likely to receive invitations to 
participate in hearings during periods of Democratic congressional control.  (I provide a 
more detailed discussion of how congressional committees select witnesses later in this 
thesis.) 
If labor unions’ success and effectiveness in the policy arena is dictated by 
environmental constraints, the nature of the actors controlling policymaking institutions 
likely has a profound effect on unions’ ability to be heard on policy matters.  Given the 
strength and persistence of the labor-left alliance in the US and considerable empirical 
support for the proposition that unions benefit from powerful Democratic allies, I 
anticipate a positive relationship between democratic control of political institutions – 
namely, Congress and the White House - and labor union participation in congressional 
hearings. 
Existing scholarship on the U.S. Congress notes that the congressional agenda is 
generally stable, but subject to punctuations at times as external events bring intense 
attention to certain policy topics (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 
2005).   In short, the docket of congressional hearings is often driven by whatever happens 
to be dominating the news headlines , whether it be nuclear safety in the aftermath of 
Three Mile Island or homeland security after the 9/11 attacks.  While interest groups, 
including labor unions, are capable of drawing congressional attention to particular niche 
issues through their own work, most of the agenda is driven by factors outside of any one 
organization’s direct control – thus, sometimes there will naturally be more opportunities 
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to be represented in Congress than others simply because the agenda will permit more or 
less time to traditional “union” issues.  Consequently, I predict that unions will be better 
represented when Congress devotes a larger share of its attention to labor and 
employment issues like funding for the NLRB and less time to issues on which unions have 
less direct expertise or interest (e.g., foreign policy and national defense). 
Economic Environment 
 
While organizations take proactive steps to actively manage environmental threats 
and uncertainty, ranking high on the list of factors that are largely out of unions’ control are 
the economic conditions that affect their members.  Even though lobbyists can be employed 
and resources can be spent to attempt to alter the congressional agenda, individual labor 
unions cannot have any meaningful impact on the national unemployment rate or the trade 
deficit with China.  Therefore, I consider economic factors separately from direct indicators 
of organizational resources and the political environment.  Macro-level indicators that 
affect the majority of unions as well as factors that can be calculated on an industry-by-
industry basis, such as wages and union density rates, constitute my independent variables 
measuring the economic environment.   
Unions differ in their local environments, in that some operate in industries with 
secure, reliable resources and others do not (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). These industry-
level factors may create different sets of constraints on, need for, and capacities for 
legislative advocacy by unions. In low union density industries, for example, unions may 
feel that legislative advocacy may be an unnecessary function at the expense of organizing; 
conversely, unions in high density industries may find little wrong with their environments 
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that merits investment in legislative action. Additionally, there is empirical evidence to 
suggest that occupational and industry-level factors affect the engagement of union 
members, which legitimizes and supports national unions’ political objectives (Fields, 
Masters, and Thacker 1987).  A vivid example of this comes from Hurd (2000), who notes 
that a performing arts union was nearly paralyzed by conflict resulting from too much 
member involvement, which he attributes to the occupation’s tendency to attract liberal, 
highly educated and outspoken practitioners.  This hypothesis is anecdotally supported by 
one of my interview subjects, who said that as a representative of a working-class, single-
occupation union, his constituency is less interested in an active legislative agenda than 
some unions representing professional and technical workers.  Social capital aside, some 
sectors of the economy – such as low wage service work - may have fewer sources of 
institutional capacity simply because members may have fewer economic resources that 
can be tapped for the all-important dues revenue that is the primary source of income for 
most unions.   
If one takes the view that unions are primarily economic institutions that exist to 
serve their members, resource dependency theory predicts they should be more active 
politically when their members’ economic security is most at risk.  Lost revenue, whether 
through loss of membership from corporate downsizing or lower dues on account of 
reduced pay, should motivate unions to directly address such environmental challenges 
and become more active organizations.  While scholars have not considered the direct 
effects of economic conditions on union political activities, Freeman (1988) argues that 
economic challenges facing private sector unions have been one of the reasons for the 
redoubling of organizing efforts targeting public sector workers over the last thirty years.    
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While organizations tend to struggle with “scanning” the environment for potential 
threats (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), economic downturns are relatively easy to detect – at 
least when compared with some of the more normative and cultural obstacles to union 
organizing and maintain a membership base.  Therefore, a poor economy (as measured by, 
for example, higher unemployment and lower productivity) will increase union 
participation in congressional hearings.  
Unions that represent public sector workers are in an especially favorable position 
to attract attention from legislators and motivate members to influence government 
policies.  Many aspects of public sector employment, such as wages, benefits, and hiring, are 
influenced by politicians, making legislative advocacy even more important for public 
sector unions than for those unions that organize in the private sector.  Federal-sector 
unions have a particularly strong interest in influencing public policy at the national level, 
given the direct relationship between government policy and working conditions for their 
workers.  Likewise, prior research suggests that federal unions have large and aggressive 
legislative departments that work to influence government policy occur regardless of 
which party controls Congress, and that their lobbying efforts are often not be 
accompanied by significant campaign contributions (Masters 1985, 2004).  Studies of the 
state and local level reach similar conclusions about public sector unions’ interest in 
political activism; police and fire departments with politically active unions tend to have 
larger budgets than departments whose unions maintain political neutrality (O’Brien 1992, 
Gely and Chandler 1995).   
In addition to the power of Congress to directly affect the fate of public sector 
unions,  public sector unions might be more likely to have large membership bases in the 
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Washington, DC, area. This might facilitate congressional advocacy because of the ease with 
which local union members can be tapped for in-person advocacy efforts and the increased 
opportunities for frequent interaction between local and international union officials that 
come with geographic proximity. 
Data 
 
In evaluating these hypotheses about the correlates of union legislative 
participation, I heed the call of Southworth and Stefan-Norris (2009) for more quantitative, 
multi-year, multi-union datasets in the field of labor studies.  My data, which combine data 
obtained from Congressional Information Service annual index books with newly collected 
indicators on non-participating unions, contains information on 204 international unions 
and labor federations over 36 years.   This study’s unit of analysis is the individual 
international (i.e., national-level) union in a given year.  The pool of unions “at risk” for 
participating in hearings in a given year is defined by the listing of national labor 
organizations in the Encyclopedia of Associations corresponding to each year. Using the 
Encyclopedia allows me to account for the numerous union mergers, name changes, 
incorporations, and dissolutions over the years and ensures that I only collect data on the 
population of unions in existence in each year.  While some data in the Encyclopedia seem 
to be estimated or rounded, Martin, Baumgartner, and McCarthy find that the Encyclopedia 
“appears to be nearly universal in its coverage of unions above even quite modest 
thresholds of organizational size and resources” (2005, p. 772).  We can be relatively 
confident, therefore, that the dataset does not unduly select unions that are more likely to 
participate in congressional hearings.  The result is a repeated cross-sectional dataset in 
14 
 
which unions typically, but not always, appear in each cross-section, as some unions are 
born, die, and/or go through periods of political dormancy over the span of the dataset. 
Dependent Variable 
 
In order to measure the extent of union participation in hearings, I constructed a 
dataset of over 2,000 congressional hearings between 1972 and 2008.  This dataset 
includes each hearing recorded by the Congressional Information Service (CIS) in every 
third year’s published Index of Subjects and Names (e.g., 1972, 1975, etc…), providing 13 
snapshots of labor’s presence on Capitol Hill in the “post-Accord” period of union decline.  
(Three-year intervals were selected to ensure equal sampling of election and non-election 
years.)  
This time series of data on union participation in congressional hearings was then 
linked to the time series of data on unions and their organizational resources, by matching 
on union names.   I consulted external reference sources (e.g., the archive of LM-2 
disclosures on the U.S. Department of Labor’s website) where appropriate to determine the 
union status of organizations with ambiguous names.  I recorded unions appearing in the 
Encyclopedia of Associations in a given year without a record in the corresponding CIS 
Index book as having zero appearances.  The number of congressional hearings 
participated in by a particular union in a particular year ranges from zero to a maximum of 
28.  Additionally, I conducted a series of interviews with labor union lobbyists and 
legislative directors to learn about how congressional hearings fit into the overall picture of 
union political activism and about longitudinal changes in the nature of congressional 
hearings. When coupled with data on organizational resources and the socioeconomic 
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environment, these data enable a systematic analysis of the factors affecting labor’s 
representation before Congress and how those factors have changed over time.   
 
Independent Variables 
 
 The design of my study takes inspiration from Masters and Delaney (1985) and 
Masters, Fiorito, and Delaney (1988), who study the role of various conceptions of 
organizational resources on union contributions to political action committees by matching 
up PAC contributions with several of the organizational resource variables I collected.  
However, the repeated cross-sectional nature of my dataset allows me to incorporate 
variables on the broader political and economic context in which unions operate.   
To measure international union membership, I collect membership figures from the 
Encyclopedia of Associations, which I also consult to determine affiliation with the AFL-CIO 
labor federation.  Membership in international unions varies widely, from 20 to 3,200,000, 
making this one of my most widely dispersed variables.  Data on the number of registered 
lobbyists and consultants for each union comes from the Washington Representatives series 
of directories, starting with their second annual directory published in 1979.1   
 Data on the weekly wages for union members and union density in unions’ 
principal industries comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Employment and Earnings 
publication, which started providing data on weekly wages for union members by industry 
and industry-level union density in 1983.  These data allow me to control for the economic 
conditions in a particular union’s core industry.  Unfortunately, no systematic data are 
                                                 
1 Data collection from the Encyclopedia of Associations and Washington Representatives leads my data on 
congressional hearings by one year, as data in these volumes are collected in the year before publication. 
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available on the composition of unions that span multiple industries, and comparable data 
are not available for 1978 or 1981.   
 To incorporate measures of environmental context, I use data from the Policy 
Agendas Project to construct a variable for the percentage of all congressional hearings 
each year on foreign and defense policy topics, as well as a variable for the percentage of 
hearings on labor and commerce topics.   This variable was computed by using the online 
data analysis tool on the Policy Agendas Project website (University of Texas 2011), which 
is available for all years except 2008, and combining total hearings in the foreign policy and 
defense major topic codes.   Data on unemployment rates comes from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics website, while historical GDP growth rates come from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis.  I measure Democratic control of Congress and the White House through a count 
of the number of chambers controlled by Democrats (0-2) and a binary dummy variable, 
respectively.   
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics  
Descriptive Statistics  
  Mean Std. Deviation 
Number of 
Cases 
Membership (in 
thousands) 
            158.51 
 
            335.20 
 
         1,603 
 AFL-CIO Member 
(1=Yes)? 
                  .64 
 
                  .48 
 
         1,603 
 Number of 
Consultants 
                  .42 
 
                  .87 
 
         1,603 
 Number of Staff 
Lobbyists 
                 1.96 
 
                 3.08 
 
         1,603 
 Inflation-Adjusted 
Union Weekly Wages 
by Industry 
               849.27 
 
               130.29 
 
         1,287 
 Industry-Level Union 
Density 
                21.33 
 
                11.82 
 
         1,287 
 Presidency 
(1=Democrat) 
                  .37 
 
                  .48 
 
         1,603 
 N of Congressional 
Chambers 
Democratic-
Controlled 
                 1.21 
 
                  .82 
 
         1,603 
 Average Annual U.S. 
Unemployment Rate 
                 6.08 
 
                  .98 
 
         1,603 
 Average Annual U.S. 
GDP Growth Rate 
                 3.47 
 
                 1.82 
 
         1,603 
 Proportion of All 
Hearings on 
Labor/Employment 
Topics 
                  .03 
 
                  .01 
 
         1,487 
 Proportion of All 
Hearings on 
Foreign/Defense 
Topics 
                  .15 
 
                  .02 
 
         1,487 
 
Number of Hearings 
in Annual CIS Index 
              1,944.45                  298.84                11 
  
 
  
Missing data on the number of lobbyists and consultants hired by each union 
(1979), industry-level wage data in the unionized sector (1982), and percentage of 
hearings on particular policy topics (2008) limit the total number of union-year units 
available for regression analysis. However, with 1,171 valid cases representing over 100 
individual international unions in each selected year from 1984 to 2005 across all 
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variables, my sample covers more of the recent period of union decline than extant studies 
of union organizational resources (e.g., Masters and Delaney 1985).  
Quantitative Analysis 
 
 My analysis of the effects of organizational resource and environmental factors on 
hearing participation is divided into three sections.  First, I contrast factors predicting the 
extent of representation with a binary logistic model that predicts whether a union appears 
in congressional testimony at all in a given year.  I then consider the effects of 
organizational resource and environmental context variables on the extent of participation 
in congressional hearings.   Here, I test three models of hearing participation: one that 
focuses on organizational resource factors, one that combines organizational resources 
with factors related to the political environment, and one that includes all independent 
variables.  Because the effect of some of these factors, such as membership and 
congressional control, may vary by time, another set of models tests for interaction effects 
between time and the core predictors of interest.   
Predicting Union Participation: A Binary Model 
 
By implementing a binary logistic regression model, it is possible to analyze the 
factors that might lead a union to pursue congressional hearings as a means of political 
activism separately from the factors that affect the extent of a union’s participation.  
Several theoretical reasons exist for contrasting these approaches.  For example, some 
unions may view congressional testimony as an essential part of the portfolio of activities 
they use to justify their value to members, but not see value in participating in more 
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hearings than necessary to fill a few pages of their quarterly newsletter.  Alternately, some 
factors may be useful for helping a union to attain some baseline level of representation but 
not sufficient to help a union become a powerful interest group.  In this analysis, I test three 
models: one that focuses on those resources which a union has direct control over, one that 
combines organizational resources with factors related to the political environment, and a 
model that combines all possible factors affecting union legislative advocacy for which I 
have data.  However, a substantial number of variables, including the total volume of 
congressional testimony in each year, the GDP growth rate, unemployment, and indicators 
of the congressional agenda are dropped from these models due to collinearity, making 
models one and two effectively identical.   
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Table 2.  Predictors of Congressional Hearing Appearance: Binary Logistic 
Regression, Fixed Effects of Year With Clustering 
  
Model 1 
(Resources) 
Model 2 
(Resources and 
Political Env.) 
Model 3 
(Combined) 
Membership (x 1,000) 
.005** .005** .007** 
(.001) (.001) (.001) 
Membership Squared (x 
1,000,000,000) 
-.002** -.002** -.003** 
(.000) (.000) (.000) 
Number of Staff Lobbyists 
.406** .406** .344** 
(.065) (.064) (.069) 
Number of Consultants 
.384** .384** .422** 
(.137) (.137) (.148) 
AFL-CIO Member? (1=Yes) 
-.001 -006 .253 
(.265) (.265) (.294) 
Public Sector Constituency 
(1=Yes)   
.478 
  
(.496) 
Union Weekly Wages (by 
Industry)   
-.003+ 
(.001) 
Union Density (by Industry)   .048* 
   (.020) 
Constant 
-1.512** -1.512** -.893 
(.244) (.244) (1.027) 
    N 1,171 1,171 1,171 
R-Squared .349 .349 .377 
    Standard errors in parentheses. ** indicates p<.01; * indicates p<.05; + indicates p<.10 
Note: Total volume of congressional hearings, GDP growth rate, unemployment rate, number of labor/commerce hearings, 
number of foreign and defense hearings, congressional control, and presidential party affiliation were dropped from my 
analyses due to collinearity. 
 
It does not come as a great surprise that having more lobbyists on staff to press a 
union’s case on Capitol Hill dramatically improves the probability of representation.  The 
probability of being represented without any staff lobbyists is slight – around 15% - but 
nearly doubles with just one representative.  According to this model, controlling for other 
factors, unions with more than 10 staff lobbyists in a given year are almost certain to be 
represented in congressional testimony (see Figure 1).  While the nature of my quantitative 
data does not permit any firm conclusions on the direction of causality, my interviews (see 
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“A Changing Institution”) with union legislative directors lead me to believe that this 
relationship between lobbying manpower and representation tends to be the result of the 
proactive efforts of lobbyists to win representation. 
 
Figure 1. Lobbying Staff and Probability of Congressional Testimony 
 
 
 
Likewise, there is a clear relationship between the probability of testifying before 
Congress and union membership. Each additional union member increases the probability 
of testifying by a very slight amount, but the squared term is negative.   Simply being an 
incorporated international union recognized by the Encyclopedia of Associations is 
associated with a 20% chance of being represented in a given Congressional Index year, 
and almost unions with more than 500,000 members have some degree of representation.   
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Figure 2. Membership and Probability of Congressional Testimony 
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Interestingly, being an AFL-CIO member union makes representation less likely in 
the first two models but more likely in the combined model – albeit not at a conventional 
level of statistical significance.  If the combined model is indeed a valid predictor of 
legislative advocacy, it suggests that AFL-CIO membership may the effect of increasing 
representation on Capitol Hill. Based on my interviews with legislative directors, I suspect 
that the coordination aspect of AFL-CIO membership may lead to this finding: the 
networking between AFL-CIO unions and referrals to member unions in responses to 
requests received from congressional aides at AFL-CIO headquarters may help ensure that 
most AFL-CIO unions are able to participate in hearings. The weak but significant negative 
relationship between weekly wages for union members in a union’s core industry and 
hearing participation in consistent with the findings of subsequent models, as is the 
positive relationship between union density in a union’s core industry and hearing 
participation. 
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Predicting the Extent of Union Participation   
 
I test my theoretical expectations on the predictors of the extent of union 
congressional testimony using fixed effects linear regression models that control for the 
effects of time (i.e., the number of years from the beginning of my dataset).   This controls 
for all year-specific variations in the political environment, not just those captured by the 
available measures. Under this specification, the parameter estimates for the remaining 
organizational resource variables will be purged of confounding effects of environmental 
characteristics.  To adjust for the lack of independence in the observations across years, 
standard errors are clustered by union (188 total clusters).  Each model is limited to the 
years in which a comprehensive data set could be assembled (1984 – 2005). 
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Table 3.  Predictors of Congressional Hearing Appearance: Fixed Effects With 
Clustering 
  
Model 1 
(Resources) 
Model 2 
(Resources and 
Political Env.) 
Model 3 
(Combined) 
Membership (x 1,000) 
.003+ .003+ .003* 
(.002) (.002) (.002) 
Membership Squared (x 
1,000,000,000) 
-.001 -.001 -.001* 
(.000) (.000) (.000) 
Number of Staff Lobbyists 
.405** .405** .348** 
(.099) (.099) (.091) 
Number of Consultants 
.124 .124 .129 
(.137) (.137) (.136) 
AFL-CIO Member? (1=Yes) 
-.385* -385* -.254 
(.189) (.189) (.245) 
Number of Foreign and 
Defense Hearings  
-.003* -.002 
 
(.001) (.002) 
Number of Labor and 
Commerce Hearings  
.070** .010 
 
(.015) (.006) 
Party of President 
(1=Democrat)  
-.599** -.071 
 
(.183) (.129) 
N of Congressional Chambers 
Under Democratic Control  
.751** 
(.137)  
Public Sector Constituency 
(1=Yes)   
.492* 
  
(.593) 
Union Weekly Wages (by 
Industry)   
-.002* 
(.001) 
Union Density (by Industry)   .031* 
   (.015) 
Unemployment Rate   .322** 
   (.063) 
GDP Growth Rate   -.004 
   (.038) 
Total Volume of Congressional 
Hearings 
.003** -.004** .001 
(.001) (.001) (.001) 
Constant 
-3.923** 2.709** -1.697+ 
(.857) (.629) (.861) 
    N 1,171 1,171 1,171 
R-Squared .396 .396 .415 
    Standard errors in parentheses. ** indicates p<.01; * indicates p<.05; + indicates p<.10 
Note: Congressional control was dropped from my analyses due to collinearity in Model 3. 
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The models in Table 3 demonstrate the significant impact of organizational 
resources on unions’ participation in legislative hearings.  Unions with larger membership 
appear in more Congressional hearings.  However, membership squared is negatively and 
significantly related to hearing appearances, meaning there are diminishing returns to 
membership size.  It is possible that this reflects “ceiling effects”: there are only so many 
hearings per year, and even the largest unions with the most diverse membership base will 
simply run out of hearings in which to appear, given that there are only about 2,000 
congressional hearings per year - of which only a small proportion will be on topics that fall 
within a union’s portfolio of policy issues.   
It also comes as little surprise that the number of people that a union has at its 
disposal in the Washington, DC area for policy advocacy activities is a major determinant of 
appearances in congressional hearings.  However, a significant distinction can be drawn 
between the effectiveness of in-house staff and hired consultants.  The number of 
consultants hired by a given union is a substantially weaker predictor of congressional 
testimony than the number staff lobbyists, lacking statistical significance in both models.  
Of course, the role of consultants differs from union to union.  While some unions may use 
consultants for specific tasks for which they lack in-house expertise for, such as planning 
advertising campaigns or analyzing data, others may be substituting consultants for staff 
lobbyists, which could negate the positive effect of consultants on legislative 
representation.   
 Table 3 also shows the expected negative relationship between membership in the 
AFL-CIO federation and representation in congressional hearings.  Given that the AFL-CIO 
itself is a major participant in the political process, it is possible that member unions feel 
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less of an obligation to maintain a presence on Capitol Hill, preferring to instead rely on the 
umbrella organization and its resources.  Likewise, the AFL-CIO may act as a coordinator 
between unions on policy initiatives, allowing its members to pursue more focused policy 
objectives and present higher quality testimony on fewer topics.  Indeed, a source with one 
of the larger public sector AFL-CIO member unions noted that he often turns down 
invitations to hearings.  The Change to Win federation split off from the AFL-CIO in late 
2005; consequently, no longitudinal analysis can be performed to test Change to Win’s 
effect on its members’ political strategies.   I provide additional insight on the role of the 
AFL-CIO in the section of this thesis devoted to topical changes in labor’s agenda. 
 The observed measures of environmental context, in contrast to those of 
organizational resources, do not seem to have a strong impact on union participation in 
congressional testimony, as evidenced by nearly identical R-squared values in Models 1 
and 2 (see Table 3). Although as a set the environmental context measures are only weak 
predictors of participation, specific environmental features are significant.   While there is a 
negative relationship between union participation and the proportion of the congressional 
agenda devoted to foreign and defense policy issues, attention to “labor” issues has a 
significant effect on union participation at hearings.  And, while the finding that unions are 
more likely to be represented when Congress is devoting more time to labor-related topics 
may sound intuitive, it confirms the hypothesis that unions are not equally likely to appear 
at all types of hearings.  There is a significant, negative relationship between Democratic 
control of both the White House and Congress and representation, implying that unions are 
less likely to be represented in years of Democratic political power.  This counterintuitive 
relationship can likely be accounted for by the Republican presidencies of Ronald Reagan 
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and George H.W. Bush in the years of my dataset in which unions enjoyed high levels of 
representation.   
 Finally, I considered the effect of all of my study’s independent variables 
simultaneously in a single model (Model 3).  This model is characterized by a higher R-
squared value than my models focusing on organizational resources and the legislative 
environment, suggesting that some of the added variables are useful in predicting hearing 
participation.  Although this model finds significant effects of several of the organizational 
resource and political environment variables already considered, several powerful 
variables in my other models (party of presidency, indicators of the topical agenda, and 
AFL-CIO membership) do not meet traditional cutoffs for statistical significance in Model 3. 
The negative net relationship between weekly wages for union members in a given 
industry and representation in hearings is unexpected and intriguing, given the models 
include a measure of membership size. The estimated coefficients imply that a large union 
with low-paid members will be better represented than a union with a comparably sized 
membership base but whose members are less well paid.  This finding is difficult to explain; 
one possibility is that unions in well-compensated sectors feel that aggressive policy 
advocacy is less necessary than those toward the bottom of the wage distribution, though 
this hypothesis is not well supported in the academic literature on union political advocacy 
or by my interview sources.  Another interpretation of this finding is as a sign that some of 
the low-wage service sector unions (e.g., the SEIU and CWA) known for revitalizing their 
organizing efforts may also be gaining representation in congressional hearings.  
Alternately, it could be an indicator that workers in highly skilled professional fields have 
alternate routes to influence policy at their disposal beyond the institution of congressional 
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hearings.  Possible interpretations of this finding are further discussed in the conclusion to 
this thesis. 
The positive relationship between industry-level union density and congressional 
representation is, by contrast, consistent with expectations. Regardless of membership or 
lobbying resources, unions in high density industries tend to participate more than those in 
low-density sectors.  One possible explanation is that unions experience less competition 
for their members’ loyalty in low density industries because there are fewer alternatives, 
and, consequently, there is less pressure for national offices to be seen as visibly fighting 
for their members’ interests.  Alternately, there could be a bias towards high union density 
industries when setting the congressional agenda.  Industries characterized by higher 
union density, such as transportation and the public sector, may be more likely to attract 
attention from legislators, whether because their activities are more directly visible to 
political constituents (the “no airline strike at Christmas” effect) or because the legislative 
aides who arrange hearings may have a richer set of union contacts in these sectors.    
Unemployment rates are positively related to union congressional appearances; 
when people are out of work, unions may be in a better position to deliver their messages 
on employment policy to Congress, or congressional agenda-setters may be more receptive 
to their messages.  GDP growth, on the other hand, does not seem to have much of an 
impact on labor’s representation on Capitol Hill. 
 Finally,  I test a measure of whether the union’s primary constituency lies in the 
public sector.  Consistent with the literature’s predictions, I find a positive relationship 
between a union’s emphasis on organizing public sector workers and congressional 
representation.  Combined, these findings suggest that representation before Congress 
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depends on a wide variety of factors, relating to both organizational resources and the 
external environment.   
Do the Correlates of Participation Change Over Time? 
 
While the strong overall relationship between organizational resources and 
representation in congressional hearings is clear, there is good reason to believe that the 
relationship may not be identical across time periods.  The political environment is 
certainly not static. Moreover, the data cover a period of substantial union decline, and it is 
reasonable to assume that union decline may have affected the impact of the observed 
covariates on participation. For example, if large, multi-occupation unions have lost 
legislative representation more quickly than smaller, more professionally-oriented single-
occupation unions, the effect of membership size and industry-level union density on the 
frequency of congressional testimony may have tapered over time.  Alternately, 
membership could be increasingly related to representation if the smallest unions find 
themselves unable to afford expensive lobbying operations as they have to fight existential 
threats to their collective bargaining functions.  If, as some of my interview sources 
indicated, congressional hearings are becoming more of a formality than an opportunity to 
influence legislators’ opinions, the unions under the most strain may be first to cut hearings 
from their legislative advocacy budgets.   
 Likewise, both political scientists (e.g., Leyden 1995, Smith 1995) and political 
commentators have suggested that monetary resources and campaign contributions have 
become more strongly tied to legislative outcomes over the last several decades.  
Consistent with this, the Washington Representatives directories have grown substantially 
over time, indicating that the cadre of lobbyists is skyrocketing.  Additionally, the union 
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leaders I interviewed for the project believe that the American political landscape has 
become more polarized over the years, with members of both parties far less interested in 
consensus-building and considering alternate viewpoints (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 
2006).  Consequently, the rewards of Democratic congressional control and the penalties of 
Republican control may have increased over time.    
To explore longitudinal changes in the effect of the observed covariates of 
participation, I fit interactions of a linear effect of time with membership, the number of 
consultants employed by each union, industry-level union density and party control of 
Congress.   The main effect of time is absorbed in the year-specific fixed effects.  Although 
the interaction effects may not be perfectly linear, they nonetheless offer a general idea of 
trend in the effect of the independent variables.   
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Table 4.  Predictors of Congressional Hearing Appearance: Fixed Effects of Year with 
Interaction Variables 
  
Model 1 
(Resources) 
Model 2 
(Resources and 
Political Env.) 
Model 3 
(Combined) 
Membership (x 1,000) 
.005* .005* .005* 
(.002) (.002) (.002) 
Membership Squared (x 
10,000,000,000) 
.006 
(.006) 
.006 
(.006) 
.003 
(.006) 
Number of Staff Lobbyists 
.989** .989** .924** 
(.013) (.013) (.124) 
Number of Consultants 
.059 .059 .074 
(.104) (.104) (.102) 
AFL-CIO Member? (1=Yes) 
-.244 -.244 -.106 
(.171) (.171) (.225) 
Number of Foreign and 
Defense Hearings  
.001 .017** 
 
(.002) (.003) 
Number of Labor and 
Commerce Hearings  
.012* .017 
 
(.005) (.006) 
Party of President 
(1=Democrat)  
-.629** -.619** 
 
(.215) (.183) 
N of Congressional Chambers 
Under Democratic Control  
-.443+ 
(.247)  
Public Sector Constituency 
(1=Yes)   
.426 
(.585) 
   (.018) 
Unemployment Rate   -.523** 
   (.128) 
GDP Growth Rate   .319** 
   (.093) 
Union Weekly Wages (by 
Industry)   
-.003** 
(.001) 
Union Density (by Industry)   .066** 
   (.018) 
Interaction: Year*Union 
Density   
-.002** 
  
(.001) 
Interaction: Year*Membership 
-.000+ -.000+ -.000* 
(.000) (.000) (.000) 
Interaction: 
Membership*Lobbyists 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
Interaction: Year*Lobbyists 
-.031** -.031** .030** 
(.005) (.005) (.005) 
Interaction: 
Year*Congressional Control  
.014+ .058** 
 
(.008) (.013) 
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Total Volume of Congressional 
Hearings 
.001** .000 -.003** 
(.000) (.001) (.001) 
Constant 
-1.834** -.150 4.218** 
(.577) (.412) (1.175) 
    N 1,171 1,171 1,171 
R-Squared .504 .504 .529 
    Standard errors in parentheses. ** indicates p<.01; * indicates p<.05; + indicates p<.10 
Note: Congressional control dropped due to collinearity in Model 3. 
 
 
Adding these interaction effects improves the fit of my models, with R-squared 
values for all three models above .500.  The coefficient for the interaction between year and 
union density is negative and significant in  the combined model, suggesting that union 
density is a stronger predictor of testimony in the early years of my dataset.  However, 
there is a significant and positive relationship between the interaction of year and 
congressional control and appearances in hearings in the political environment and 
combined models suggesting that Democratic control of Congress became a more 
important predictor of testimony over time.  My test for an interaction between the size of 
a union’s membership base and the number of lobbyists it hires did not yield significant 
results. Perhaps most notably, the estimated coefficient of the interaction of time and 
membership is negative and significant, suggesting that membership becomes a less 
powerful predictor of representation in hearings over the period of this study.   
Given the strong assumptions of linearity in the model specifications in Table 4, I 
replicated the regression of participation on organizational resources to data stratified by 
year.  
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Figure 3. Longitudinal Changes in Estimated Membership Effects 
 
 
Note: all coefficients significant at p<.05. 
 
Breaking out the regression analysis corresponding to Model 1 in Table 3 by year 
reveals a striking pattern in the relationship between membership and appearances in 
congressional hearings.  Figure 3 shows the decline in the value of a strong membership 
base in influencing congressional testimony over time.  While this is an imperfect measure 
due to the trend towards consolidation in the labor movement (resulting in a decline in the 
total number of unions in existence over time, complicating a direct comparison between 
years), it does illustrate the diminishing effect of size illustrated in Table 4.  The estimated 
effects of membership in 2005 and 2008 are negative, indicating a significant change in the 
labor’s participation in hearings.  Consistent with the suggestion that larger unions may be 
facing the most serious challenges in maintaining representation on Capitol Hill, this seems 
to be indicative of a change in labor’s overall presence in favor of smaller unions making up 
a larger proportion of the movement’s representation.   
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The Labor Agenda 
 
In addition to providing an indicator of the intensity of union participation, 
congressional hearings also enable the analysis of what policy topics dominate unions’ 
political agendas.  Are labor unions’ agendas changing as the correlates of testimony 
change over time?  In this section, I briefly consider broad trends in the labor movement’s 
aggregate policy agendas and present evidence to suggest that there has been a narrowing 
of labor’s policy agenda concurrent with increasing resource scarcity over the last four 
decades.   
In addition to drawing on the Policy Agendas Project as a source of control variables 
on the broad political environment, I used the Policy Agendas Project coding scheme to 
classify each of the congressional hearings in my dataset by topic.  With over 83,000 
records, the Policy Agendas Project’s dataset contains a detailed topic code for each 
congressional hearing held between World War II and the late 2000’s.  By matching the 
hearings in my data with hearings catalogued by the Policy Agendas Project on the basis of 
Congressional Index accession numbers (a unique identifier for each hearing), I can 
construct a data set with indicators of the types of hearings in which unions are testifying.   
On first glance, labor's political agenda (see Figure 4) has been fairly stable in the 
context of a decline in its overall participation in hearings.  While the percentage of 
hearings devoted to labor and immigration policy has increased slightly since the early 
1990's, the data show little evidence of an aggregate shift away from testimony on broader 
social issues.  It is possible, however, that this apparent stability is masking cross-union 
variations in participation. If, for example, industrial unions are participating less on 
hearings about social issues (e.g., healthcare, education), but the (relatively) high-growth 
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unions in the healthcare and education sectors are participating more in such hearings, the 
aggregate trend will be flat.  Testing for such cross-union differences would require 
crafting a meaningful typology of different types of unions, however – which is significantly 
complicated by the trend toward industrial and occupational diversification within unions. 
Union legislative directors indicate that in on average, their agendas have narrowed 
somewhat over time as unions have struggled to gain attention in a hostile political 
environment.  With fewer resources and less interest on the part of legislators, some 
unions have had to pick and choose which topics are most important to their policy goals.  
Suggestions that a hostile political environment may have forced unions to retreat to a less 
ambitious agenda is supported by a glance at the total number of policy topics (as defined 
by the Policy Agendas Project) that labor as a whole testified on in a given year: by this 
measure, the breadth of labor’s agenda has been sliced in half since the 1970’s (Figure 5), 
with a sharp decline immediately following the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994. 
 
Figure 4. The Labor Agenda, by Broad Category 
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Figure 5. Number of Discrete Topic Codes Among All Union Appearances Each Year
 
 
Figure 6 shows that the AFL-CIO's decline has been roughly proportional to the 
overall drop in union participation.    Dues are calculated for each member union to the 
AFL-CIO national organization on the basis of the size of the constituent union’s 
membership rolls.  Due to falling union density, the AFL-CIO has lost important sources of 
revenue.  Sources within the AFL-CIO and its constituent unions agree that the AFL-CIO 
national headquarters in Washington, DC has probably lost about half of its staff over the 
last twenty years on account of a series of budget cuts.  Consistent with Pfeffer and 
Salancik’s (1978) prediction of organizational retreat to focus on core functions in times of 
crisis, several of the research units within the AFL-CIO that were once dedicated to broad 
progressive causes of interest to the labor movement – such as the Center for International 
Labor Solidarity and the Social Security Department – have either been eliminated 
altogether or suffered severe cutbacks over the last few decades. 
It is difficult to say whether the decline in AFL-CIO activity in 1996 is merely a 
byproduct of a generally weak year for the labor agenda or a result of a change in strategies 
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when John Sweeney became president in 1995 and called for a shift away from the 
organization’s traditional electoral and legislative advocacy role in favor of reinvigorating 
union organizing.  The Sweeney agenda and subsequent calls for labor to more aggressively 
pursue organizing, which ultimately cumulated in the creation of the Change to Win 
federation in 2005, may partially account for a decline in union and AFL-CIO activity in 
1996 and subsequent years.  Figure 4 and 5 suggest that, while the overall congressional 
agenda was narrower in 1996 than other years, it was proportionately composed more of 
topics that are not traditionally on the union agenda.  An analysis of 1996 hearings on the 
Policy Agendas Project website suggests that legislative activity related to defense and 
international affairs was particularly high in 1996, which could also partially account for 
the dip in union and AFL-CIO activity in 1996.   
 
Figure 6. AFL-CIO Hearings Relative to Union Congressional Activity 
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issues more directly related to unions' role in the workplace.  Though my interview sources 
believed that the AFL-CIO has not significantly adjusted its agenda in light of the 
increasingly public sector nature of its member unions, Figure 7 suggests that there have 
been substantive changes in the federation’s agenda.  It does seem that the proportion of 
the AFL-CIO agenda devoted to economic issues has shrunk substantially since the early 
90’s, and that this divestiture has come at the same time that labor and immigration issues 
have absorbed a relatively larger slice of the agenda. 
 
Figure 7. The AFL-CIO Agenda
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further analyze the inner workings of the AFL-CIO.  (See Appendix 1 for further details 
about my data collection process.) 
Congressional Hearings, a Changing Institution 
 
The preceding empirical analysis speaks to the predictors of labor’s political 
representation, but not to the nature, and potentially changing nature, of congressional 
hearings as a tool in the union’s political arsenal. Indeed, scholarly accounts of the role of 
congressional hearings in the policymaking process are largely lacking.  To understand the 
role of congressional hearings in the contemporary labor toolkit, I conducted a series of 
interviews with labor union legislative directors in the summer of 2010.  I spoke with eight 
legislative directors and other high-level officials in labor unions and the AFL-CIO labor 
federation.  Respondents were found through a snowball sampling technique, starting with 
initial leads from Cornell ILR faculty.  Each interview was conducted by telephone, and 
lasted between 30 minutes and an hour; interviews were not recorded, but I took extensive 
“field notes” during the interviewers.  In each interview, I asked legislative directors to 
describe the function of congressional hearings in their overall legislative advocacy 
strategies, explain the process of being invited to appear in congressional hearings, and 
describe how their legislative advocacy strategies have changed.   
One of the key findings to emerge from my interviews is that congressional 
hearings' role in the policymaking process has changed from a key source of information on 
policy proposals to more of a formality.  To my knowledge, this finding is absent from the 
literature on American political institutions.  According to union officials, members of 
Congress take hearings less seriously now than in the past and attend them only 
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intermittently. Indeed, legislators now drop in and out of hearings rather than stay for the 
entire hearing, and the norm is to ask a few questions of a particular witness and then 
leave. This is possibly a consequence of the compression of the congressional workweek in 
recent years.  Anecdotal evidence also suggests that hearings are shorter. Even if the 
number of hearings per year has not changed significantly over the years, the number of 
people invited to testify before each hearing may have changed in the aggregate, in addition 
to the effects of Republican control over hearing schedules.  This may affect the number of 
“slots” in which a union could potentially be scheduled to testify, and might partially 
explain the trend towards reduced hearing participation over time. 
One of the trends noted by sources with historical knowledge of hearings is a trend 
towards amplifying the entertainment value of hearings, with a new emphasis on 
“soundbytes” and emotional first-hand accounts of events over academic, fact-laden 
testimony.  "Common" people are more likely to appear today than in the past, as their 
accounts become more valued by committee staffers, who in turn want to maximize the 
probability that a hearing will be picked up by cable news channels or quoted in members' 
press releases.  This emphasis on emotion is not only a result of the 24-hour news cycle or 
television coverage of hearings.  Union lobbyists speculate that part of the reason for the 
decline of fact-laden testimony from researchers, academics, and union officials detached 
from the day-to-day experience of workers is the availability of technical data and detailed 
research reports that can be downloaded through the Internet. The policy positions of most 
major unions, for example, can be found on their respective websites, along with research 
reports and press releases.   
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This availability of information means that, for some legislators, positions are set in 
place before the hearing begins.  Union legislative directors report that questioning tends 
to be predictable; questions for many witnesses today are “softballs” that allow witnesses 
to offer emotion-laden opinions, rather than representing rigorous inquiry.  While all of my 
sources agree that hearings’ shift from fact dissemination to public relations tool has been 
gradual, many suggest that hearings have been “for show” to some extent for as long as 
they can remember – including some sources who have worked in the labor movement’s 
political arm for the duration of my dataset.  While some have argued that congressional 
hearings have the potential to shape policy (e.g. Burstein and Hirsh 2007), I have been 
careful not to make claims about the relationship between representation in hearings and 
obtaining favorable policy outcomes.  Individuals with experience testifying in 
congressional hearings have told me that they doubt that they had the opportunity to 
persuade anyone through testimony, regardless of how powerful their arguments may 
have been.   
It should be noted that the trend towards sensationalizing advocacy in hope of 
gaining media coverage has not only been driven by the committees.  Unions themselves 
have also placed a greater emphasis on staging events and planting soundbytes into 
testimony in hope of standing out in the deluge of information that characterizes American 
politics today.  Additionally, one source suggested that unions are interested in leveraging 
positive media coverage to improve public opinion of labor.  While other sources spoke of 
negative attitudes towards labor in a general sense as an obstacle to testimony in recent 
years that even a Democratic Congress cannot overcome, they generally did not see 
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improving the overall standing of labor in American society to be a goal of legislative 
advocacy departments.   
Despite institutional changes that seem to devalue the role of the hearing, some 
unions still view appearance in congressional testimony to be a high priority.  According to 
one union legislative officer, whenever a request for a hearing witness comes in from a 
congressional committee it instantly becomes the office's highest priority.  Others, 
however, said that in recent years they have declined some requests for testimony or 
simply submitted a short written statement in lieu of taking the effort to prepare a witness 
for live testimony due to the perception that hearings lack impact.  Regardless of external 
impact, the role of congressional hearings as evidence of a union’s involvement in 
policymaking for internal consumption should not be underestimated.  Membership-based 
organizations of all kinds publicize their appearances in congressional hearings through 
newsletters, website features, social media and the like as evidence of the organization’s 
activities and creation of member value. 
Associated with the trend towards more personal, emotional testimony is that 
committees may be de-emphasizing the formal organizational affiliation of witnesses in the 
formal record of the hearing.  The new Democratic Congress seems to be interested in 
hearing from ordinary workers without regard to which union they happen to belong to, 
even if the legislative department of the worker’s union was instrumental in facilitating his 
or her appearance through coordination with committee staff, writing testimony, covering 
travel expenses, and so on. My sources suggest that this may have intensified significantly 
in recent years, which could be a partial explanation for why there was not a more 
dramatic rise in the overall number of labor witnesses in the 2008 Congressional Index 
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year following the 2006 Democratic takeover of Congress.  However, this trend does not 
seem to be consistent across unions: while service sector unions may portray their 
members as ordinary workers, professional unions emphasize the greater credibility of 
testimony from technical experts (e.g., airline pilots).  Future studies could take note of 
witnesses listed without affiliation and track their appearances over time as a crude 
measure of the diffusion of “person on the street” testimony.  
My interviewees also stressed that hearings are only one of many mechanisms 
through which unions can influence public policy.  Unions are sometimes able to bring their 
members to Washington and stage grassroots efforts at influencing debates already 
underway, as in the SEIU’s controversial practice of staging protests on commuter bridges 
at rush hour, but normally the campaign season infrastructure is not used to directly 
pressure legislators on Capitol Hill.  Some unions have reinvested in efforts to influence 
policy through maximizing informal contact with legislators and congressional staffers.  In 
essence, they have reverted to classic back-room lobbying.  Letter writing is another staple 
of union legislative activism that has not died down in recent years - indeed, the exclusion 
of unions from hearings in years of Republican control may have elevated the importance 
of unsolicited letters.  Appearances at receptions and hearings outside of the official 
schedule of congressional committees – for example, at meetings of federal advisory boards 
and regulatory comment sessions – may also be on the rise, according to some union 
sources.   
Considering the scope of the activities stretching beyond congressional hearings 
described in my interviews with union legislative directors, it is worth revisiting the 
original predictions of Pfeffer and Salancik that were applied to labor by Katz, Batt, and 
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Keefe: unions may respond to environmental challenges (namely, weak labor law and 
hostile attitudes) through a reinvestment in efforts to secure a more favorable 
environmental context, including investment in political campaigning and lobbying.  
Despite reports that the AFL-CIO has seen a dramatic drawdown in organizational capacity 
in the wake of budget cuts, some unions report a reinvestment in legislative advocacy in 
recent years. For example, one of the major Change to Win unions reported that both 
measurable resources and less tangible energy and inertia in favor of legislative action has 
increased in recent years.  Additionally, labor as a whole made some investments in 
interorganizational linkages that should be acknowledged in any discussion of their 
response to environmental threats.  The Economic Policy Institute was formed in the mid-
80’s – a time when unions were beginning to realize the full extent of the political and 
public opinion challenges facing labor – in large part to help coordinate labor’s political 
message and avoid duplicative research across union legislative and research departments.   
Discussion and Conclusions 
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
 
 The core lesson of this research is that unions’ organizational resources and 
environments shape their participation in congressional hearings, often in complex ways.  
Membership size is certainly a key predictor of which unions are represented, but its role 
has changed over time.  The political environment matters a great deal for whether unions 
are able to participate, with Democratic control of political institutions improving unions’ 
chances at gaining seats at the table.  The impact of economic factors is more varied, 
though: for example, while high unemployment rates make unions more likely to 
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participate, higher wages in unions’ core industries appear to depress participation.  And, 
these relationships change over time; membership, for example, is a significantly less 
important predictor of the extent of a union’s congressional testimony in 2005 than it was 
in 1984. 
What implications does this research have for practitioners working in the labor 
movement? One implication is that labor unions have more control over their legislative 
destiny than those who fixate on the political environment might predict.   While party 
control of Congress matters, to be sure, it is not the sole determinant of who gets to speak 
in hearing testimony.   
Membership seems to matter a great deal, suggesting that organizing may bring 
additional benefits to other aspects of unions’ operations.   Unions seeking more political 
influence should not discount the interdependence of legislative advocacy and organizing 
efforts: more members not only mean more dues revenue, but also more foot soldiers that 
can be deployed in letter-writing and grassroots advocacy, as well as more legitimacy in the 
eyes of congressional committee schedulers. 
 The finding that membership is becoming a less important predictor of testimony 
over time should encourage unions to think beyond the raw number of membership cards 
they issue and strategically consider who they organize.  Additionally, the finding that 
unions operating in low wage, high union density sectors of the economy are likely to be 
represented could guide union organizers to more aggressively seek out workers in fields 
where labor has a strong foothold yet a clear need still exists – on a pessimistic note, one 
interpretation of this finding suggests that union organizing in the low union density 
service sector may not be an effective strategy for unions seeking greater political 
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representation.  Alternately, because their members feel more economically secure, one 
might imagine that unions representing better paid occupations are more content with the 
“status quo” and feel less pressure to actively influence public policy.  The literature on 
social movement unionism and union revitalization (e.g., Voss and Sherman 2000, Milkman 
2006, Bronfenbrenner 2007) likewise offers a plausible interpretation: many of the largest 
unions commonly labeled “revitalized” – such as the SEIU and CWA – organize in the 
service sector, which is traditionally associated with lower wages than manufacturing and 
transportation.   
 With respect to interest group politics more broadly, this study suggests that the 
benefits of size for large membership organizations have diminished over time.  While this 
study does not definitely test whether this diminishing effect is a function of the overall 
growth in the number of organizations represented on Capitol Hill, the growth of powerful 
niche interests seems to be a likely culprit for the diminishing effectiveness of large 
organizations.   However, other explanations exist, such as the possibility that membership 
is no longer as strong of an indicator of the organizational resources that enable policy 
advocacy as it once was.   Further research on this topic is warranted. 
Limitations 
 
Like all sociological research, this study leaves some stones unturned.  A more 
complex study of the applicability of resource dependence theory to organized labor might 
consider gathering data on collaborations and competition within the labor movement, 
which have significantly affected legislative strategies over the years.   Additionally, this 
study does not measure change in organizational resources as an independent variable, as 
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in a time series analysis: consequently, it is difficult to definitively determine whether a 
sense of organizational decline has any particular effect on political activism through my 
quantitative analysis.  (However, as noted already in this thesis, I did broach the topic in my 
interviews with union legislative directors, which yielded some insights.) 
One weakness of the listing of consultants in Washington Representatives is that 
little is stated about the role of each consultant in the policymaking process; Washington 
Representatives does not differentiate between a consultant hired to launch a full-blown 
corporate campaign and a consultant brought on for a quick strategy session, although it 
remains the best source of data available for this project.  Likewise, membership is an 
imperfect measure of organizational resources.  While I attempted to capture financial 
resources through the inclusion of within-industry union members’ weekly wages , this is 
certainly an imperfect measure, if for no other reason than that different unions charge 
their members different dues.  Ideally, data on union finances would be available for the 
entire length of my dataset from a centralized source; while Department of Labor LM-2 
filings are available online for the later years of my dataset and data from the early 80’s are 
available in Troy and Sheflin’s Union Sourcebook (1985), filling in the remaining years of 
my dataset would be impossible without extensive travel for archival research. 
Directions for Further Research 
 
 In addition to filling the need for comprehensive data on the whole universe of labor 
unions noted by Southworth and Stepan-Norris, this dataset permits analysis of the 
obstacles facing labor unions in the post-accord era and the process of legislative advocacy 
for national membership-based organizations.  Additionally, this study tests Pfeffer and 
Salancik’s predictions on organizational political activism in a unique context. Despite some 
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of the institutional changes to affect Congress in recent years, hearings remain a powerful 
statement of the agenda of the nation’s policymakers. Future projects with this dataset 
could consider how network ties between labor unions, as manifested through joint 
hearing appearances, affect legislative representation.  Under what circumstances are 
collaborative or concurrent efforts to influence policy most influential?  The effect of union 
mergers could also be studied using this data: are workers in merged unions effectively 
represented by their new legislative departments?  Additionally, this dataset could be used 
in conjunction with data on legislative actions, answering questions related to policy 
change, rather than simple representation.  Do unions achieve meaningful policy changes as 
a result of congressional hearings, controlling for other factors that could influence the 
policymaking process?  It may be useful to locate archival data on unions’ campaign 
contributions to pair with this data to investigate the relationship between legislative 
advocacy and electoral campaigning, though this would require substantial archival 
research.     
Conclusion 
  
Though my analysis of congressional hearing testimony yields relatively few 
surprises about the nature of labor union legislative advocacy, it confirms much of what is 
already known about the effects of organizational resources on political influence.   Strong 
organizations are most likely to be heard in the political arena, even if we don’t know 
whether their voices lead to substantive policy change.  However, this thesis also tells a 
story of changing institutions.  Membership is becoming less predictive of congressional 
hearing testimony over time, and congressional hearings are themselves transforming from 
a forum for the presentation of policy-related facts to a series of talking points and 
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soundbytes.  Given the enormous stakes involved in the formulation of public policy, the 
impact of these changes on the democratic process and policy outcomes deserve more 
attention. 
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Appendix 1: Extended Description of Data Sources 
 
The dataset of congressional hearing appearances was collected from the annual 
volumes of the Congressional Information Service’s Index of Subjects and Names (CIS 
Index).  I used the CIS Index to identify every congressional hearing with at least one union 
witness in every third volume, starting with the 2008 printed index and working back to 
1972.  Although the dates of the hearings cataloged in each year’s CIS Index do not 
correspond perfectly to the calendar year, I see no reason to believe that this practice 
results in year-to-year inconsistencies that significantly skew my analysis. The decision to 
sample every third annual volume was motivated both by a desire to maximize longitudinal 
coverage under time and resource constraints.  For each union hearing, I recorded the year 
of the volume, the “accession number” (a unique identifier), the congressional committee 
holding the hearing (with the word “Senate” included in Senate committees), a brief 
description in my own words, a code for each union and labor federation that appeared (up 
to a maximum of 13 recorded unions), the AFL-CIO division if the AFL-CIO was present at 
the hearing, and the date of the hearing.  This coding procedure yielded a record similar to 
Table 5, which omits the empty columns for additional unions and AFL-CIO divisions that 
did not participate in this particular hearing.  A few unions were missed because I did not 
recognize them as unions in the CIS Index books using this method, though after using the 
Encyclopedia of Associations to define the universe of unions in existence in each year (see 
below) I was able to go back and identify all union appearances missed in my initial data 
collection.   
 
Table 5.  Sample Data Collection Record 
CIS 
Year 
Accession 
Number 
(book) Committee Brief Title 
Specific 
Union 
Second 
Union 
Third 
Union 
Fourth 
Union 
Fifth 
Union 
AFL-CIO 
Division Date 
1981 
1981-
H161-26 Agriculture 
Prohibition of 
export of 
unprocessed logs 1 134 142 65 143 State/Regional 02/16/1981 
 
 
The next step in assembling my dataset of hearings was to code each hearing based 
on subject matter.  In order to achieve this, I relied on the existing master dataset from the 
Policy Agendas Project, an effort to track the contours of the congressional agenda over 
time by coding each congressional hearing since 1945 in accordance with a carefully 
constructed codebook with approximately 200 unique topic codes.  I was already quite 
familiar with the Policy Agendas Project’s codebook and coding procedure through my 
contributions to the project from working on it as an undergraduate research assistant on 
at the University of Washington several years ago; knowing that each hearing is reviewed 
by at least three coders (and is subject to substantial review if there is any disagreement) 
gives me great confidence in the validity of the project’s topical codes.  I downloaded the 
master datafile of congressional hearings (with approximately 83,000 records) containing 
unique topic codes for each hearing, and matched their hearing records with my own 
dataset on the basis of CIS accession numbers.  From this dataset, for example, I learned 
that the hearing shown in the above table was coded as 2103, which corresponds to 
“Natural Resources, Public Lands, and Forest Management.”  Because the Policy Agendas 
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Project had not yet coded 2008 hearings at the time I appended these codes in 2010, I 
coded the 2008 hearings in my dataset according to my knowledge of their codebook.  In 
order to produce Figures 4 and 7 in this thesis, I collapsed dozens of related codes together 
to simplify analysis. 
 
 While this dataset permitted descriptive analysis of trends in labor’s congressional 
agenda, I wanted to learn more about the factors that affect congressional hearing 
appearances.  To achieve this, I constructed a measure of the number of hearing 
appearances by each union in each year.  Creating this variable required building 
histograms of the union codes that appeared in each CIS Index volume.  I then used the 
Encyclopedia of Associations annual volumes to fill in membership for each union-year case 
in my new dataset.  Because data for each year’s Encyclopedia is collected in the year before 
publication, Encyclopedia data led hearings data by one year (i.e., 1979 Encyclopedia data 
was matched to data from the 1978 CIS Index).  As I identified unions listed in the 
Encyclopedia that did not exist in my dataset (and could not be found after double-checking 
the CIS Index), they were added for the appropriate year and listed as having zero hearing 
appearances.  Likewise, the Encyclopedia, by providing a definitive list of the unions in 
existence in a given year, allowed me to avoid listing unions in my dataset that had 
officially merged or dissolved – resolving a substantial concern, given that the number of 
unions in existence shrank from 160 in 1984 to 116 in 2008 (see Figure 8).  Unfortunately, 
tracking the reasons for the emergence or dissolution of unions was beyond the scope of 
my data collection, though I can be certain that 51.06% of the unions in my dataset 
appeared across all eight years analyzed in Tables 2-4 (Figures 9-10). The Encyclopedia 
also provided useful, up-to-date data on AFL-CIO affiliation, which was quite useful because 
several unions have drifted in and out of the AFL-CIO over the years.  After establishing a 
union’s existence, membership and AFL-CIO affiliation through the Encyclopedia, I used the 
Washington Representatives annual series of directories to identify the number of staff 
lobbyists and external registered lobbying consultants hired by each union in each year.  As 
with the Encyclopedia, data collection from Washington Representatives volumes led CIS 
Indices by one year to ensure consistency.  Washington Representatives data was thus 
collected in every third year from its initial publication in 1979 through 2009.   
 
  
52 
 
Figure 8. Population of International Unions and Labor Federations, 1978-2008  
 
Figures 9 and 10. Number of Dataset Years in Which Each Union is Present, as Frequencies 
and Proportions 
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I then categorized each union into one of the standard major industry groupings 
used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in its Employment and Earnings annual volumes.  
This is one area where my data collection may have been vulnerable to subjectivity, as it 
was sometimes necessary to make an educated guess about a union’s core industry; for 
example, the United Auto Workers were judged to be a manufacturing union due to their 
historical affiliation with the auto industry, even though they have an active ongoing 
initiative to organize graduate teaching assistants.  For each union-year, I entered the 
respective industry-level union density rate and average weekly wages for union members 
the union’s core industry.   All weekly wages were translated into 2009 dollars using the 
BLS Inflation Calculator, available online at 
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm.   Unemployment and GDP growth rate 
data were obtained directly from the BLS website. 
 
 Data on the number of chambers of Congress controlled by Democrats each year and 
the party affiliation of the President were confirmed using The World Almanac. Data on 
congressional attention devoted to foreign policy, defense, labor, and commerce topics 
were obtained from the Policy Agendas Project.  The number of hearings in each CIS Index 
year were obtained through the Policy Analysis Tool at www.policyagendas.org. Multiple 
topic codes were combined to create the “foreign and defense policy” variable.  Finally, I 
relied on the Policy Agendas Project to calculate the number of congressional hearings in 
each CIS Index volume (using the spreadsheet with all 83,000 hearings containing CIS 
Index accession numbers) to control for the overall level of congressional activity each 
year.   
 
 Interview data came from a variety of subjects who, despite being recruited through 
snowball sampling, seem to have represented a reasonable cross-section of the labor 
movement.  Due to the small N (8) of legislative directors and related officials interviewed, 
6.915%
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it would breach confidentiality to name the specific organizations for which they work. It 
should be sufficient to say that they included the AFL-CIO national association, an AFL-CIO 
public safety workers’ union, a large multi-occupation AFL-CIO manufacturing sector 
union, and a large multi-occupation service sector union affiliated with Change to Win.   I 
relied on handwritten notes to record the key points made by my subjects, which were 
incorporated into an early draft of this thesis shortly after the interviews were completed 
late in the summer of 2010.   
Appendix 2: Distributions of Variables 
 
The charts below show the distributions of my dependent and independent 
variables for years covered in my regression models.    
Hearing Participation 
 This chart shows the distribution of my dependent variable, the number of hearings 
participated in by a particular union in a particular year.  The concentration of unions 
participating in zero hearings suggests that the majority of unions do not participate in a 
hearing in a given year; among those unions that do participate, most participate in less 
than 10 hearings.  Though invisible on this chart, the maximum number of hearings 
participated in by a particular union in a given year is 28. 
 
Figure 11. Pooled Histogram of Hearing Participation by Union-Year 
 
Membership 
 
The charts below shows the general contours of my membership variable.  While 
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters was the largest union in my dataset through 
the mid-90’s, the National Education Association took its place as the largest union from 
1999 onwards.  I also illustrate the characteristics of my membership variable through a 
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pooled histogram that indicates the distribution of union-year cases based on membership 
size; nearly half of the union-year cases in my dataset have less than 100,000 members, 
which is not particularly surprising given the ongoing prevalence of small unions in 
creative industries, the professional sector, and obscure occupations (e.g., longshoreing).  
Table 6 gives another overview of changes in the distribution of my membership variable 
across the years analyzed in Tables 2-4.  Examples of these small unions can be seen in a 
list of the ten smallest union-year cases in my dataset (Table 7) along the ten largest union-
years in my dataset (Table 8).   
 
Figure 12. Scatterplot of Union Membership by Year, with Largest Distinguishable Unions 
Identified 
 
Figure 13.  Pooled Histogram of Union Membership 
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Table 6. Percentile Distribution of Membership Size 
 All Years 1984 2005 
1st 125 57 150 
5th 300 380 250 
10th 600 860 600 
25th 5,000 5,000 6,753 
50th 35,000 32,500 50,000 
75th 145,000 152,500 145,000 
90th 370,000 375,000 500,000 
95th 837,932 818,966 850,000 
99th 1,600,800 1,600,800 1,600,000 
 
Table 7. Ten Smallest “International” Union-Year Cases in Dataset  
Year Name of Union Membership 
1999 Flight Engineers’ International Association 20 
1987 Guild of Italian-American Actors 50 
1984 Guild of Italian-American Actors 50 
1990 Yiddish Writers’ Union 57 
1987 Yiddish Writers’ Union 57 
1984 Yiddish Writers’ Union 57 
1990 Guild of Italian-American Actors 70 
1993 Guild of Italian-American Actors 70 
1999 National Association of Special Police and Security Officers 75 
1999 International Union of Journeymen Horseshoers of the US and Canada 110 
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Table 8. Ten Largest “International” Union-Year Cases in Dataset  
Year Name of Union Membership 
2005 National Education Association 2, 700,000 
2002 National Education Association 2,376,108 
1999 National Education Association 2,376,108 
1996 National Education Association 2,000,800 
1993 National Education Association 2,000,800 
1990 International Brotherhood of Teamsters 2,000,000 
1984 International Brotherhood of Teamsters 2,000,000 
1987 International Brotherhood of Teamsters 2,000,000 
1993 International Brotherhood of Teamsters 1,800,000 
1984 National Education Association 1,600,800 
Lobbyists  
 Figure 14 illustrates the distribution of my variable measuring the number of staff 
lobbyists employed by each union. 
 
Figure 14. Distribution of Staff Lobbyists 
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Consultants 
Figure 15 illustrates the distribution of my variable measuring the number of 
political consultants hired by each union. 
 
Figure 15. Distribution of Union Political Consultants 
 
AFL-CIO Affiliation 
 Figure 16 shows the change (or lack thereof) in the proportion of unions in my 
dataset affiliated with the AFL-CIO federation across the years analyzed in Tables 2-4. 
 
Figure 16. Longitudinal Change in AFL-CIO Affiliation 
 
Union Density 
 Figure 17 illustrates the distribution of my variable measuring the union 
density rate for the core industry associated with each union. 
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Figure 17. Distribution of Industry-Level Union Density Rates 
 
Union Weekly Wages 
 Figure 18 illustrates the distribution of inflation-adjusted weekly wages for union 
members in ten industry supersectors by year.  Mining, an outlier in 2002, is illustrated.  
Figure 19 gives the frequency of union-years characterized by each bracket of wages. 
 
Figure 18. Distribution of Industry-Level Union Member Weekly Wages by Year 
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Figure 19. Pooled Histogram of Union Member Industry-Level Weekly Wages 
 
Unemployment Rate 
Figure 20 illustrates the distribution of my variable measuring the average 
unemployment rate in each year of my dataset. 
 
Figure 20. Annual Unemployment Rates 
 
GDP Growth Rate 
Figure 21 illustrates the distribution of my variable measuring the average GDP 
growth rate in each year of my dataset. 
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Figure 21. Annual GDP Growth Rate 
 
N of Labor Hearings 
Figure 22 illustrates the distribution of my variable measuring the number of labor 
and related congressional hearings in each year of my dataset. 
 
Figure 22. Number of Labor-Related Congressional Hearings Each Year 
 
 
N of Foreign and Defense Hearings 
Figure 23 illustrates the distribution of my variable measuring the number of 
foreign and defense policy congressional hearings in each year of my dataset. 
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Figure 23. Number of Foreign and Defense Policy Congressional Hearings Each Year 
 
Public Sector Constituency 
Figure 24 shows the change (or lack thereof) in the proportion of unions in my 
dataset that primarily organize workers in the public sector across the years analyzed in 
Tables 2-4. 
 
Figure 24. Longitudinal Change in Proportion of Unions Primarily Representing Public 
Sector Workers 
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